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I. INTRODUCTION
The complexities of modem society increase the amount of necessary
government actions and decrease the amount of deliberation that goes into
them. The resulting strain on our policymaking system leads government
officials to rely on lobbyists and leads lobbyists to fight viciously for
influence over government officials. Symptoms of this problem surface with
scandals like the Abramoff' affair and trends such as the recent lobbying
boom. These instances of corruption and inefficiency in congressional
practices have renewed interest in lobbying reform. While lobbyists provide
legislatures with benefits such as information and representation of special
interests, lobbying often becomes a spending war between conflicting
interests that consumes the efforts of both legislators and advocacy groups.
Currently, the only limitations on lobbying practices are disclosure laws that
require lobbyists to reveal their lobbying activities after spending a certain
amount influencing officials.
Mediation may offer an adaptable and widely beneficial enforcement
mechanism for lobbying reform. If Congress had the power to push opposing
interest groups to enter mediation before spending a certain amount in
lobbying on an issue, they may be able to preclude costly, indirect fighting
by reaching consensus over policy action. Opening and facilitating
communication among interests may help to improve legislation and reduce
the corruption that is associated with interest group pressure. This process,
which I will call "interest group mediation," would combine existing
lobbying practices with two simple legislative mechanisms to decrease
malignant lobbyist activity and improve the quality of public policy. Aside
from solving problems, interest group mediation offers a model for the
optimal use of lobbyists in congressional practice and points to broader
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implications of increasing the democratic value of government institutions to
better fit modem conditions.
Part II of this Note describes the lobbying boom and its negative
consequences. Part III presents the basic idea of interest group mediation as
the solution to the inefficiency and corruption involved with current lobbying
practices. Part IV describes existing governmental structures that use
mediation in creating consensual public policy such as negotiated rulemaking
and public dispute resolution. Part V explains the mechanisms Congress will
need to create in order to implement this process. Finally, Part VI draws
broader conclusions on optimal lobbying practices and on using interest
group mediation to improve the democratic value of legislative enactments.
II. THE PROBLEM: CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY IN CURRENT
LOBBYING PRACTICES
A. The Lobbying Boom
The uncontrolled growth of the lobbying industry is the most important
recent development in how the federal government is run. These practices
"exploded '2 in the last decade and the resulting lobbying pressure on U.S.
policymakers is at an all-time high.3 The number of registered lobbyists in
Washington more than doubled between 2000 and 2005, 4 and through these
agents, interest groups and corporations 5 spend $2 billion every year
influencing Congress.6 These groups consider indirect influence to be a
necessary and even beneficial cost.7 In fact, many consider lobbying to be a
2 Ken Silverstein & Jess Taylor, Profiting through Influence: The Pharmaceuticals
and Lobbying Industries, in IT'S LEGAL BUT IT AIN'T RIGHT 253, 266 (Nikos Passas &
Neva Goodwin eds., 2007) (There are an estimated 40,000-80,000 lobbyists in
Washington, D.C., which is "a minimum of seventy-five for every member of
Congress.").
3 Brody Mullins, US. Lobbying Tab Hits a Record, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2006, at
A6 ("U.S. corporations and interest groups spent a total of $1.16 billion to lobby
Washington in the first half of 2005, setting a record.").
4 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Road to Riches Is Called K Street: Lobbying Firms Hire
More, Pay More, Charge More to Influence Government, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at
A01.
5 Mullins, supra note 3.
6 Peter Katel, Lobbying Boom, CQ RESEARCHER (July 2005).
7 Birnbaum, supra note 4 (stating that such lobbying expenditures are the "cost of
doing business in the federal environment"); see also Don Feder, Lobbying Is a Cost of
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better investment than campaign contributions, 8 and one Washington firm
disclosed that its clients can expect to receive one hundred dollars in tangible
benefits for every dollar spent on lobbying.9
The main reason that this industry is so profitable is that government is
expanding.' 0 A growth in government creates incentives to use lobbyists to
seek opportunities as they arise, monitor legislative activity, and protect
acquired benefits. First, expansion causes active rent-seeking 1 because the
proliferation of newly-created structures and policies are "government
goodies" that offer influence and control to corporations and interests.12
Because there are increased opportunities in doing business with
Washington, 13 businesses become more aggressive, creating a feeding frenzy
for influence. 14 Next, the increased activity in Congress creates a need for
lobbyists to merely monitor the legislature. 15 Though lobbying implies
cajoling and bribing, most of the practice currently involves gathering
information 16 to apprise clients of what regulators are doing. 17 Finally, this
growth creates an incentive for lobbying as a protectionist measure-benefits
that are obtained by one interest group are quickly overwhelmed and negated
by advantages given to others. 18 Many players in Washington advise
Doing Business in Washington - report on money spent lobbying members of Congress,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec. 18, 2000.
8 Silverstein & Taylor, supra note 2, at 264.
9 See Radnor Inc., http://www.radnor-inc.com/lobbying.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2007) (Radnor Inc. is a "legislative relations and political consulting firm based in
Washington, D.C.").
10 See Birnbaum, supra note 4 (attributing the "lobbying boom" initially to "rapid
growth in government"); see also Don Feder, In age of big government, lobbyists meet a
pressing need, JEWISH WORLD REv., Nov. 20, 2000 ("An increase in government creates
more of a demand for defensive lobbying and PAC contributions.").
11 Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's
Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 439 (1987) ("A crude definition of rent-seeking is using
the power of the state to increase one person's wealth at the expense of another's.").
12 Birnbaum, supra note 4.
13 Id. ("Washington has become a profit center.").
14 Silverstein & Taylor, supra note 2, at 266.
15 Birnbaum, supra note 4.
16 EDWARD V. SCHNEIER & BERTRAM GROSS, CONGRESS TODAY 149 (1993) (citing
studies showing that business lobbyists "spend more time communicating with their own
members than they do lobbying," indicating that gathering information is a greater focus
than is influencing policy).
17 Birnbaum, supra note 4.
18 Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred
Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 296, 316 (1993).
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continued lobbying protection after obtaining benefits, warning that "[a]s
government grows, unless you're right there to limit it, it can intrude in just
about any industry."'19 As a result, when they need benefits, protection, or
just information, organizations that deal with Congress have no choice but to
hire lobbyists.20 Furthermore, this growth in government may not be a
temporary phenomenon, but rather the natural effect of an increasingly
complicated society. 21 Therefore, as America continues to become more
complex, lobbying pressure may further intensify.
B. Negative Effects of Unrestricted Lobbying
Though extensive lobbying practices create benefits for some, 22 this
influence-peddling has substantial negative externalities. 23 The permanent
presence of lobbyists in Washington that use cultivated relationships with
officials to sway public policy is unfair and highly suspect.24 Furthermore,
interest groups that attempt to outspend each other on indirect influence are
engaging in a risky and inefficient practice.25
Though our representative system values direct citizen input,26 the use of
permanent, organized lobbying was not part of the intended design27 and is a
19 Birnbaum, supra note 4 (quoting Robert L. Livingston, a Republican former
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, currently president of a lobbying
firm).
20 Id. ("[W]hether it is to protect themselves against harm or to win more benefits,
executives and insiders say they have no choice but to hire lobbyists.").
21 Congressman Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of
Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
321, 326 (1994) ("As America grew, the problems facing it became more complex, and
the House's workload increased.").
22 See infra Part VI.A. (discussing the key benefits of lobbying and how interest
group mediation preserved them).
23 Silverstein & Taylor, supra note 2, at 255.
24 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 37-38, 56-57 (1987).
25 Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1181 n.53 (2006) ("[I]n negotiations
between legislators and lobbyists, long-term legislation or 'deals' between the parties hold
higher value because they reduce transaction costs and risks.").
26 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 56 ("Lobbying is a means for voters
to supplement their electoral intentions and to express the intensity of their concerns in a
manner not presented for a yes-or-no vote.").
27 Id. at 37 (The "founding fathers never anticipated a permanent cadre of
lobbyists.").
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cause of distrust of congressional practices. 28 Because lobbyists often
advocate policy choices to public officials with whom they have preexisting
relationships instead of advocating with merit and substance, 29 the results
may be unfair,30 and even the appearance of undue influence creates
cynicism and friction from potential losers.31 Further exacerbating this
problem, the recent "gold rush"32 to create and protect benefits through
lobbying intensifies the corruption between legislators and lobbyists. With
incentives leading lobbying interests to fight viciously for influence,
legislators are tempted with lavish gifts and contributions that lobbyists are
willing to provide.33 Pressures on competing interests, therefore, lead to
lobbying pressure on officials, through relationships that are so cozy that
they are potentially illegal.34 Under these close relationships, legislators
distribute government benefits through unethical "backstage dealings" and
earmark appropriations. 35 These practices are growing out of control 36 and
distracting lawmakers from their core duties.37 Thus, the unrestrained
lobbying practices in Congress have led to corrupt dealings that hinder
legislators from acting in the best interests of the country.
Another problem with the lobbying boom is the inefficient practice of
defensive lobbying. Defensive lobbying is "lobbying aimed at avoiding the
28 Id. at 38 (noting that while we promote private citizens expressing concerns to
their representatives, we distrust permanent, highly-organized legislative lobbyists of
special interests).
29 Id. at 57.
30 Id. at 56.
31 Id. at 57.
32 Birnbaum, supra note 4.
33 For example, Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham (R-Cal.) received a "Rolls-Royce,
a yacht, and a 19th-century Louis-Philippe commode." Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan
Weisman, Congressman Admits Taking Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST, November 29,
2005, at AO1. In another example, Ohio Republican Robert W. Ney admitted to receiving
"'a stream of things of value,' including the golf trip, from [Jack] Abramoff in exchange
for political favors." Norman Ornstein, Argument, A Watchdog that Didn't Bark: Jack
Abramofs guilty plea has made corrupt lobbying a very big story. Where were the media
when coverage might have curbed the sleaze?, LEGAL AFF. 18, 19 (Mar.-Apr. 2006).
34 Babcock & Weisman, supra note 33, at AO1.
35 Jonathan Weisman & Charles R. Babcock, K Street's New Ways Spawn More
Pork: As Barriers With Lawmakers Fall, 'Earmarks' Grow, WASH. POST, January 27,
2006, at AO 1 ("These relationships have coincided with the rapid growth in the volume of
home-state pork-barrel projects, commonly called earmarks.").
36 Id. (quoting Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)).
37 Id. (quoting Scott Lilly, who recently retired as chief Democratic aide on the
House Appropriations Committee).
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harm that other peoples' lobbying and other rent-seeking actions are likely to
cause." 38 As explained above, to secure benefits and prevent harm, industries
spend millions of dollars39 and much of their lobbying efforts40 engaging in
protectionist lobbying activities.41 While lobbying is arguably positive as a
source of information for lawmakers42 and as a voice for affected interests,43
money spent on defensive lobbying is "non-economic" 44 because it is spent
to counteract lobbying expenditures from opposing interests. 45 When two
groups aim their lobbying efforts at undermining one another's influence, the
net effect is the same as if neither was spending money on lobbying at all,
and the only thing that is created is obstruction of productivity in
Washington. Defensive lobbying, therefore, expands the lobbying industry46
and consumes efforts of legislators and petitioning interests in what is
basically a spending race over indirect influence. Though businesses
3 8 j. PATRICK GUNNING, UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC CHOICE 349 (2003), available at http://nomadpress.com/public-choice/ud-16.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
39 Roger S. Ballentine, President, Green Strategies, Inc., Keynote Address, Building
a Brighter Future for Coal by Building a Better Politics of Coal (Aug. 6, 2003), available
at http://www.greenstrategies.com/vision/CLEAN%20COAL/COAL-
GEN%20SPEECH.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that the industry was "forced
to spend millions of dollars on defensive lobbying efforts in Washington and at the state
level").
40 Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/l160258785.shtml#148466 (Oct. 7, 2006) (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
41 One lobbying firm lists such activities as "defeating harmful proposals, amending
them to your favor, exempting the industry out of the proposal, [and] preempting efforts."
Capitol Solutions, http://www.capitol-solutions.com/cs/services.php#defensive (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008).
42 Christopher J.S. Termini, Note, Return on Political Investment: The Puzzle of Ex
Ante Investment in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C., 92 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1038 (2006)
("Lobbyists facilitate this information processing by providing pertinent facts, rather than
persuasive threats. In this light, lobbying as an information transmission process may be a
necessary lubricant to effective lawmaking.").
43 See SCHNEIER & GRoss, supra note 16, at 291.
44 Ballentine, supra note 39.
45 Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (2002) ("[T]he
redistributive lobbying by corporations as a class for the most part victimized other
corporations.").
46 GUNNING, supra note 38, at 349 ("The lobbying industry is even larger than
otherwise because of what we might call defensive lobbying.").
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nevertheless engage in defensive lobbying because of the profitable return,
this practice is inefficient and problematic.
C. Current Regulations
Regulating the corrupt and inefficient aspects of lobbying is not easy
because of the constitutional difficulty of regulating political speech47 and
because it is difficult to regulate those aspects without hindering positive
lobbying practices. 48 Because lobbying efforts provide lawmakers with
citizens' viewpoints, 49 any attempt to reform these practices implicates the
First Amendment right to petition the government. 50 The regulation of
lobbying is therefore a balance between the constitutional right to petition
and the practical need to fight undue influence from special interests. 51 As a
result, lobbying reform uses non-intrusive mechanisms such as registration
for lobbyists and public disclosure of their lobbying expenditures. 52
Disclosure laws are based on the idea that public opinion would harness
the interaction of interest groups and the government. 53 However, the public
has not filled this role, 54 leaving disclosure laws ineffective. 55 As a result, the
current mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the nation's lobbying and
47 WILLIAM V. LUNEBURG & THOMAS M. SusMAN, THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS 11 (2005).
48 See infra Part VI.A (discussing the positive aspects of lobbying that must be
preserved and unhindered by regulation).
49 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 56 ("Lobbying is a means for voters
to supplement their electoral intentions and to express the intensity of their concerns in a
manner not presented for a yes-or-no vote.").
50 Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating
Associational Privacy and the Right to Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 717, 717 (1995).
51 Id. (discussing the search for the "most desirable method of balancing individual
liberties with the need for lobbying regulation").
52 LUNEBURG & SUSMAN, supra note 47, at 7.
53 William P. Fuller, Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Much Needed
Reforms on the Horizon, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 419, 420 (1993).
54 Id. (discussing the use of public oversight of lobbying activities and concluding
that "these ideals have never been realized through the use of disclosure laws"); Craig
Holman, Disclosure is Fine, but Genuine Lobbying Reform Must Focus on Behavior, 31
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 5, 7 (2006). ("No matter how good the lobbying and ethics law
may be-and not much is expected to emerge from this Congress-the law doesn't mean
a thing if no one is watching.") (emphasis added).
55 Fuller, supra note 53, at 419 ("Indeed, these enactments have been largely
irrelevant and ineffectual.").
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ethics laws are dismissed as "sheer folly."'56 Recent reform efforts offer little
hope because they rely on continued use of these inherently weak methods.57
Thus, "[d]isclosure is not enough"58-the only way to affect current lobbying
practices is to change the process. 59
Because the Constitution protects lobbyist activity and because
disclosure laws are ineffective, new approaches are necessary in lobbying
reform.60 Currently, lobbying is so crucial to the inner workings of
Congress6' and so critical to the fortunes of businesses and special interests62
that genuine reform must venture beyond the behavior of only lobbyists.63 In
order to preserve the necessary lobbyist functions while regulating corrupt
and suspect practices in Congress, the focus is shifting to the interest groups
and politicians that interact with the lobbyists.64 The key would be
structuring the interaction among these actors so that, in pursuing their
56 Holman, supra note 54, at 6.
57 McGehee, supra note 1, at 4 (describing current reform efforts in which
"[i]ncreased disclosure of lobbyists' activities is a primary feature of both the House and
Senate bills," describing these reforms as "weak legislation," and concluding that
"[n]either bill sufficiently addresses the problems with the current system"); James M.
Demarco, Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why Lobby Reform is Unimportant,
8 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 599, 627 (1994) ("Laws increasing the amount
of disclosure a lobbying group must offer border on the superfluous.").
58 Holman, supra note 54, at 7.
59 McGehee, supra note 1, at 5 ("The American public will know for sure when
meaningful reform has taken place because they will see a change in the process.").
60 Demarco, supra note 57, at 627 ("Laws restricting the amount of lobbying
activities are unconstitutional.").
61 SCHNEIER & GRoss, supra note 16, at 292 (stating that Congress relies on the
advice and information of others); id. at 300-01 (describing the place of lobbyists in the
internal structure of Congress).
62 Holman, supra note 54, at 5 (The "business of lobbying has become so lucrative,
and so critical to the fortunes of businesses and special interests, that genuine lobbying
reform today must venture into the regulation of the conduct of lobbyists and the ethical
behavior of members of Congress and their staff.").
63 1d. See also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-
Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 517 (2007) (suggesting
an "interest-group-based approach to lobbying regulation").
64 Krishnakumar, supra note 63, at 517 ("[Tlhe key to accomplishing such public-
regarding reform is to focus not on lobbyists, as Congress has done for the past two
centuries, but on the two entities between which lobbyists mediate: elected officials and
interest groups.").
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separate self interests, they further public goals. 65 And because of First
Amendment implications, the improved process must use a soft mechanism
that controls corruption and inefficiency without hindering political speech.
III. THE SOLUTION: USING MEDIATION AS A PROCESS-BASED
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
As a forum for facilitated negotiation, mediation has the potential to
serve as a soft, process-based mechanism for guiding lobbying activities in
productive directions. To add some substance to registration and disclosure
laws,66 Congress can compel interest groups and corporations that spend a
certain amount in lobbying efforts to mediate with opposing interests.
Interest group mediation may therefore serve as an enforcement mechanism 67
that can limit lobbying practices while facilitating political speech and
productive action. This mechanism will empower interest groups, create
collaborative public policies, and reduce lobbying pressures 68-once the
interest groups reach negotiated consensus on a course of action, there is no
need for conflicting lobbying between them. These benefits do not come with
significant costs because the consensus-building supplements and does not
supersede traditional practices. Interest group mediation would therefore
create parallel adversarial and cooperative efforts-lobbyists and members of
Congress acting under conventional methods while the affected interests
65 Id. (stating that it is most efficient to structure lobbying regulations in a way that
makes it likely that, as these interests act to maximize their own best interests, they also
will further public goals).
66 Lauren Eber, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S: CAL.
L. REv. 1155, 1158 n.18 (2006) (quoting Sen. John McCain, "We can pass all of the
Rules changes we want in this body, but they are useless unless we back it up with a
tough enforcement mechanism.").
67 Martha Weinstein, Mediation: Fulfilling the Promise of Democracy, 74 FLA. B.J.
35, 35 (2000) (stating that mediation creates "structure without bureaucracy").
68 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 11 (stating that, as a supplement to
conventional decisionmaking procedures, "negotiated approaches to consensus
building ... have worked effectively in many situations" to facilitate cooperation among
various interests); id. at 55 (describing face-to-face negotiations as a method to getting
commitment from stakeholders to remedy the problem of non-commitment from political
institutions); see also Laura L. Wright, Note, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast Track for
the Twenty-First Century?, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 979, 996 (2004) (noting that
where the legislature is given the choice of voting for or against pre-negotiated solutions,
this "'all or nothing' methodology.., reduces the pressure on representatives by special-
interest groups"). Thus, facilitating negotiation among interests and then presenting these
policies to Congress for approval will reduce lobbying pressures.
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attempt negotiated consensus. Thus, the congressional power to compel
mediation among competing interests that are tangled in a lobbying war may
serve to improve the legislative process.
A. Current Practice and the Callfor Mediation
Traditional legislative practices are becoming increasingly ineffective in
addressing public policy disputes. 69 Public officials have difficulty managing
the divisive influence of conflicting interests70 that hinder movement in
policymaking. 71 These interest groups make it easier to block policy than to
create it72 because they fragment the process by building a complicated web
of shifting alliances. 73 Unresponsive to these interests, elections and
traditional political activities do not resolve the disputes.74 Though the
legislative process provides for input from interest groups, it acts on bare
majorities and does not promote sufficient long-term commitment to
policies. 75 Because the affected parties do not have direct control in the
representative system, any legislative action may provoke stakeholders to use
indirect methods such as lobbying, tough media campaigns, and other means
to assert leverage over the process, mainly by blocking governmental
action.76 These interest groups compete with one another to persuade and
pressure elected representatives 77 under a winner-takes-all mindset.78
Such a system, in promoting tough public posturing 79 and adversarial
politics, 80 tends to discourage the affected parties from direct communication
69 Robert Zeinemann, The Characterization of Public Sector Mediation, 24
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 49, 53 (Spring 2001); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347,347-48 (2004-05).
70 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
71 SUSSK1ND & CRuIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that, as a result of the
adversarial system of policymaking, "[p]ublic officials are unable to take action, even
when everyone agrees that something needs to be done").
72 Telephone Interview with Sean P. Dunn, President, Sean Dunn L.L.C. (Mar. 5,
2007); see also SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 3-8.
73 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
74 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 9.
75 Id. at 39, 48.
7 6 1d. at4.
77 Brett A. Williams, Comment, Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Policy
Disputes, 2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 135, 147.
78 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 70-73.
79 Id. at 137.
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and negotiation. 81 Less negotiation creates greater risk for affected interests
and involves higher transaction costs in policymaking. 82 Also, the adversarial
process often ignores the reality that public disputes are not zero-sum
situations 83 and can, therefore, overlook consensual solutions 84 that would
better satisfy the interests of petitioning groups.85 These adversarial
processes are ripe for the introduction of institutionalized mediation as a tool
to facilitate agreement among affected interest groups. 86
Disputes among conflicting interest groups 87 can be handled under
mediation,88 where affected interests control the process while a neutral third
party facilitates communication and encourages collaborative problem
solving. 89 Mediation is a useful tool90 for handling public conflicts because it
is a democratic method of bringing interacting interests to consensus. 91 These
direct, facilitated negotiations are a flexible, rational means for addressing
80 Christa Daryl Slaton, An Overview of the Emerging Political Paradigm: A Web of
Transformational Theories, in TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS: THEORY, STUDY, AND
PRACTICE 13 (Stephen Woolpert et al. eds., 1998) (describing the modem, liberal theory
of politics as "adversarial").
81 Pub. L. No. 101-648, 1990 S 303.
82 McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 25, at 1181 n.53 ("[I]n negotiations between
legislators and lobbyists, long-term legislation or 'deals' between the parties hold higher
value because they reduce transaction costs and risks.").
83 Williams, supra note 77, at 136.
8 4 KENNETH CLOKE, MEDIATION: REVENGE AND THE MAGIC OF FORGIVENESS 274
(1990) (Mediation "allows conflicting parties to reach settlements that are satisfactory to
each of them.").
85 Williams, supra note 77, at 147 (stating that, because of a focus on adversarial
mechanisms, "Often, the political process will not provide adequate solutions to the
concerns of many interested individuals").
86 Aric J. Garza, Resolving Public Policy Disputes in Texas without Litigation: The
Case for Use ofAlternative Dispute Resolution by Governmental Entities, 31 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 987,989 (2000).
87 Linda L. Putnam, Formal Negotiations: The Product Side of Organizational
Conflict, in CONFLICT AND ORGANIZATIONS: COMMUNICATIVE PROCESSES 184 (Anne
Maydan Nicotera ed., 1995) (describing intergroup disputes which "often [arise] from
coalitions or interest groups that unify under a common set of issues, beliefs, or values").
88 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 275 ("Mediation can be used by individuals, groups,
institutions, or entire societies.").
89 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 35 (quoting CLOKE, supra note 84).
90 Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the
Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1998) (stating that "mediation is a tool").
91 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 274.
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various interests because they create an open, hostility-free environment
where parties maintain control and confidentiality. 92 Under this process,
"U]ustice is created rather than dictated." 93
B. Benefits of Mediation among Lobbying Interests
Mediation offers significant benefits to the legislation process. To bring
this type of organized consensus-building into normal legislative functioning
without burdening interests or clogging the system, the proposed mechanism
of interest group mediation is hinged on lobbying expenditures. This section
will present the practical realities of institutionalized mediation in
legislatures and conclude that bringing opposing interests to mediate as part
of lobbying reform will effectively channel their efforts towards cooperation
without the burdensome requirements of consensus.
As applied to lobbying activity, mediation may lead to faster results,
lower costs, more adaptable policies,94 and other benefits, 95 because it
involves direct participation from the affected interest groups.96 The nature
of conflict in legislative action always involves two sides.97 While mediation
would not apply to a dispute where a specific interest works against
unilateral government action, lobbyists would contend that there is always an
opposing interest to negotiate against. 98 Under the current system, conflicting
interests hire lobbyists to influence legislative decisionmaking. 99 As a result,
lobbyists filter communication 100 from constituents to legislators, who then
create uncommitted, inflexible policies.' 0 ' However, facilitating direct
discussions between conflicting interests to create consensual policies would
92 Cassandra G. Mott, Note, Macy's Miracle on 34th Street: Employing Mediation to
Develop the Reorganization Plan in a Mega-Chapter 11 Case, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 193,207 (1998).
93 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 36.
94 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
95 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 21-33 (identifying other benefits
including fairness (21-25), efficiency (26-28), wisdom (28-30), and stability (31-33)).
96 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
97 Interview with Mike Toman, President, Ohio Lobbying Association, in
Columbus, Ohio (July 26, 2007).98 Id.
99 SCHNEIER AND GROSS, supra note 16, at 300-0 1.
100 Id. at 300.
101 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 48.
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eliminate the filters'0 2  and avoid unnecessary bureaucracy. 10 3  This
mechanism can, furthermore, free issues from being held "hostage" for
unrelated items in political compromises and create coherent, consistent
packages of legislative action. 10 4 Also, because the outcome is not forced on
any party, policies produced by consensus are more sustainable and easier to
implement, creating efficiency in other branches of the government. 10 5 Thus,
mediation among conflicting interest groups would increase efficiency in
handling differences 10 6 and thereby free up the costs and efforts of both
members of Congress and of competing interest groups.
Another outcome of direct communication among interest groups is more
responsive policy. 10 7 Because it provides affected parties with direct control
over proposals, the use of mediation in creating public policy empowers the
interest groups.' 08 Also, by addressing all interests through direct stakeholder
participation, 10 9 mediation creates policies in consideration of as many
different interests as possible. 110 Thus, interests that are dissatisfied with
narrow decisionmaking majorities'' may eagerly welcome mediation as a
process that aims at broad agreement in policymaking. "12
102 Stephen P. Younger, Effective Representation of Corporate Clients in Mediation,
59 ALB. L. REv. 951, 958 (1996) (discussing the benefits of direct communication in that
"[m]ediation allows a lawyer to speak directly to the client on the other side without
having each communication filtered by another lawyer. This process should be used to its
optimal benefit.").
103 Nancy D. Erbe, Appreciating Mediation's Global Role in Promoting Good
Governance, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 355, 376-77 (2006).
104 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 54.
105 Erbe, supra note 103, at 372.
106 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 35 (promoting the use of mediation to resolve
"organizational conflicts through consensus allowing a maximum of unity and a
minimum loss in energy, time, and money").
107 SussKiND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 13; see also Zeinemann, supra note
69, at 53-54.
108 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 274 (stating that mediation "encourages
empowerment").
109 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 11 (advocating "face-to-face
interaction among specially chosen representatives of all 'stakeholding' groups").
110 Erbe, supra note 103, at 415 (stating that mediation "creates outcomes truly
responsive to diverse needs at all levels of society through consensus-building").
111 Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 373, 408
(2000); see also SussKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 39.
112 Graber, supra note 111, at 408.
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Some may argue that this direct involvement takes power away from the
legislators" l 3 and takes policymaking away from public scrutiny.1 4 It is true
that interest group mediation would involve the drafting of public policy by
interest groups in private confidential meetings. However, legislators would
retain power over what disputes are mediated and whether the proposals are
adopted." 15 Because the confidential meetings involve interest groups and not
elected or appointed officials, action under this scheme conforms to the
purposes and requirements of Sunshine laws by keeping official
decisionmaking open and public."16 This scheme allows unofficial action to
remain appropriately private and keeps official action appropriately
public. 1 7 Thus, legislators would support interest group mediation and
would retain the power and the duty to protect the public good in the public
eye. In fact, legislators prefer that parties work out the dispute themselves,
rather than having to choose one group over another," i8 and almost always
accept consensual proposals. 119
Another criticism may be that forcing issues through consensus-based
processes hinders development and promotes the status quo. 120 Because
interest group mediation provides the means to hinge lobbying ability on
participation in mediations, Congress will be able to force groups to
negotiate over an issue. The method for doing this may involve a limitation
or a reduction in lobbying expenditures that takes effect when the interest
groups are not participating in good-faith, productive negotiations. This
113 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
14 H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at 2 (1976) ("The basic premise of the Sunshine
legislation is that, in the words of Federalist No. 49, 'the people are the only legitimate
fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter... is derived.'
Government is and should be the servant of the people, and it should be fully accountable
to them for the actions which it supposedly takes on their behalf.").
115 Id.
116 Kathy Bradley, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 476 (1997)
("The Act requires every portion of every meeting of an agency... to be open to public
observation. A 'meeting' is defined as deliberations which include the number of
individuals required to make decisions on behalf of an agency, and result in disposition
of agency business.") (emphasis added).
117 S. REP. No. 94-354, at 1 (1975) (stating that "government should conduct the
public's business in public").
118 Dunn, supra note 72; see also SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 136.
119 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53.
12 0 BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 63 (2004); see also Toman, supra note 97; Dunn, supra note 72.
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dynamic will create an incentive for the groups to participate in the
mediation while simultaneously controlling lobbying expenditures. However,
the reason that this system does not hinder valid action with burdensome
consensus building is that the proposed mechanism is imposed only on the
interest groups and can be applied evenly. By consuming only the efforts of
the direct interests, the lobbyists remain able to address the issue with
traditional methods. Though this procedure constrains lobbying action by
imposing spending controls on interests, Congress will be able to apply these
limitations to both sides of an issue evenly, meaning that neither side gets an
advantage in the adversarial forum while participating in mediation. Thus, by
synthesizing a forum for antagonistic political debate with a forum for
effective stakeholder negotiation, this process may combine the beneficial
qualities of both adversarial and cooperative approaches while mitigating the
disadvantages of each.' 21 Interest group mediation would therefore promote
collaboration and efficiency without disrupting or threatening Congress's
proper role in policymaking.
As proposed, interest group mediation therefore creates a rational and
coherent process without hindering current legislative practices. Recognizing
the potential benefits of cooperation among interests in creating policy, many
argue that "federal, state, and local governments must resolve to increase
their use of consensual processes when confronted with public disputes."' 22
Interest group mediation may be an optimal vehicle for this consensus-
building-it does not promote the status quo because it allows affected
interests to spend money on lobbying as long as they participate in good-
faith, productive mediation. Because it is hinged on lobbying expenditures,
interest group mediation is a flexible, rational method of institutionalizing
mediation in congressional practices.
C. Interest Group Mediation in Political and Corporate Lobbying
Disputes
Aside from being more efficient and responsive, interest group mediation
has much promise when specifically used with the corporations and political
groups that regularly lobby Congress. Though groups that represent opposing
121 Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace
Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 39, 77 (1988) (discussing the
possibility of "abandoning the notion of a choice between adversarial and cooperative
models and developing instead institutional structures that combine the virtues and
mitigate the disadvantages of each").
122 Williams, supra note 77, at 151.
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political values put forth seemingly irreconcilable public positions, 123 they
are indeed capable of calmly discussing and clarifying positions on
fundamental political disagreements 124 even when they involve divisive
issues. 125 Such a process may uncover common ground and alternative
solutions which recognize diverse interests while acknowledging and
legitimizing areas of disagreement. 126 Therefore, mediation may be an
effective method for dealing with interest groups that have a political dispute.
Corporations are also a major player in congressional lobbying 127
because, in competing with each other for market privilege, 128 they become
involved in difficult conflicts 129 on a regular basis. 130 In competing in the
lobbying arena, these businesses victimize each other 131 through expensive,
escalating offensive and defensive lobbying campaigns. 132 Corporations
often end up spending much of their lobbying efforts solely on counteracting
their competitors' lobbying expenditures. 133  This "collective action
problem"'134 could be handled more efficiently by creating concerted action
through a uniform regulation. 135 Congress can offer petitioning interests the
opportunity to avoid mutually destructive actions by compelling the parties
123 SussKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 137.
124 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 274.
125 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two
Theories and Practices of Participation in the Polity, 12 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18
(Winter 2006) (stating that consensual public policymaking methods "have also been
applied in addressing divisive political issues such as affirmative action and abortion").
126 Id.
127 Silverstein & Taylor, supra note 2, at 266 (describing lobbyists as the "great
majority whom work for business interests").
128 GUNNING, supra note 38, at 349 ("Many large companies today in the more
developed democracies employ resources to seek market privilege. The result is a large
lobbying industry.").
129 McEwen, supra note 90, at 9 (1998) ("Contentious and competitive corporate
cultures could both encourage disputes in the first place and get in the way of their
efficient resolution.").
130 Id. at 6 ("[B]ig businesses regularly find themselves embroiled in conflicts.").
131 Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 1125 (2002) (stating that through "redistributive
lobbying, corporations as a class, for the most part, victimized other corporations").
132 Silverstein & Taylor, supra note 2, at 265 ("Corporate lobbyists do not win every
battle, but when they lose, it is often because a competing corporate faction bought up
even more lobbying firepower.").
133 See supra Part II.B (discussing defensive lobbying).
134 Sitkoff, supra note 45, at 1125.
135 Id. at 1106, 1125.
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to negotiate under mediation, allowing them to jointly roll back defensive
lobbying efforts. Besides creating the opportunity for corporations to
cooperate in reducing inefficient lobbying practices, mediation provides a
new perspective that "has the potential to promote effective management that
makes resolution faster, less expensive, and of higher quality."' 136 Thus,
interest group mediation is particularly suited for corporate conflicts that are
conducted through legislative lobbying practices.
Because interest group mediation would benefit both political interest
groups (by empowering them and causing them to reach out to a greater
number of people) and corporations (by facilitating more cooperative
business and reducing lobbying costs) this program would be fully
acceptable to lobbying interests. As demonstrated above, by pushing
competing interests into direct communication under the productive guidance
of mediation, Congress can avoid superfluous lobbying battles that consume
the attention of legislators and the money of interest groups. Mediation is
ideal because it is a soft, process-based mechanism that conducts political
speech instead of limiting it and provides "structure without bureaucracy."' 137
Thus, compulsory mediation can be a lobbying reform mechanism that would
use facilitated negotiations to resolve legislative disputes and serve as a
model for coercion-free, community-empowering conflict resolution. 138
Interest group mediation seems to be a logical solution to problems in
lobbying reform and legislative interactions. The only problem is that
because such structured mediation in Congress is untested, this system is
somewhat speculative. However, the use of structured mediation in creating
public policy exists in other areas of American government and these
practices can serve as guidance for the interest group mediation system.
IV. EXAMPLES OF CONSENSUS-BASED PUBLIC POLICYMAKING
While there is no evidence of structured mediation in congressional
practices, such consensual methods are not uncommon to public
policyrnaking. The established practices of negotiated administrative
rulemaking and public dispute resolution will serve as guiding examples.
136 McEwen, supra note 90, at 6 (1998) (adding that under corporate "management
of disputing ... Where the management of disputing is weak or inconsistent, costs appear
higher, disputes longer, and relationships in greater jeopardy, but where that management
is coherent, strong, and oriented to reasonable settlement, costs are likely to be lower,
disputes shorter, and relationships more often preserved").
137 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 35.
138 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 276.
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Because of similarities in the parties involved and the methods used,
successful use of mediation by these political institutions in creating public
policy heralds similar results in mediation among interest groups as proposed
in this Note.
A. Negotiated Rulemaking
The use of mediation among interested parties in direct negotiation is
already an established policymaking process in the federal government.
Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 139 federal administrative agencies
convene1 40 a committee composed of interested parties 141 that informally
negotiate under the guidance of a facilitator 142 in order to reach consensus 143
on the substance of a proposed rule. 144 This mediation mechanism allows
agencies to involve affected interests in the process of drafting a rule 145 as a
way to supplement normal procedure. 146 When used in appropriate
139 Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2000).
140 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (2000) ("An agency may establish a negotiated rulemaking
committee to negotiate and develop a proposed rule.").
141 5 U.S.C. § 563(b)(2)(b) (2000) (stating that the committee can contain "[p]ersons
who will be significantly affected by a proposed rule and who believe that their interests
will not be adequately represented"); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1256-57
(1997) ("The agency establishes a committee comprised of representatives from regulated
firms, trade associations, citizen groups, and other affected organizations, as well as
members of the agency staff.").
142 5 U.S.C. § 566(d)(2) (2000) (stating that the facilitator has the duty to
"impartially assist the members of the committee in conducting discussions and
negotiations").
143 5 U.S.C. § 562(7) (2000) (stating that the committees are to "discuss issues for
the purpose of reaching a consensus in the development of a proposed rule").
144 Williams, supra note 77, at 149 ("[R]epresentatives of the agency and other
interested parties engage in face-to-face negotiations concerning the text of the proposed
rule. The parties work toward achieving a consensus on the rule, at which point the APA
notice and comment provisions take over.").
145 Scott F. Johnson, Administrative Agencies: A Comparison of New Hampshire
and Federal Agencies' History, Structure and Rulemaking Requirements, 4 PIERCE L.
REv. 435,446 (2006).
146 Coglianese, supra note 141, at 1256 ("Negotiated rulemaking supplements the
notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with a
negotiation process that takes place before an agency issues a proposed regulation.").
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disputes, 147 this process promises to increase the acceptability and improve
the substance of rules. 148
Congress created this mechanism to improve the process of
administrative rulemaking. Rulemaking is a legislative, policymaking power
delegated to administrative agencies 149 to implement broad Congressional
mandates.150 In order to ensure that agencies remained in the bounds of the
legislature's will in using this power, Congress set up mechanisms to
structure agency discretion' 51 and the courts apply judicial review over
agency decisions.' 52 One method of guiding administrative rulemaking is to
open the proceedings to public input 153 through "notice and comment"
procedures 154 and have interested lobbyists monitor agency action. 155
However, listening to both sides of a problem and liberal judicial review are
major sources of delay and inefficiency. 156 More importantly, critics argue
that notice and comment and litigation rights do not create adequate citizen
responsiveness.1 57 These forms of public participation do not usually involve
147 Williams, supra note 77, at 149 ("[N]egotiated rulemaking is more appropriate in
certain circumstances than in others.").
148 5 U.S.C. § 581 NOTE, Section 2 Findings (5) (2000).
149 WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 36
(1985).
150 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) (defining a rule as an "agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy").
151 WEST, supra note 149, at 3-4, 7.
152 David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative Agency Rulemaking:
"Reasoned Analysis," the Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National Park Service
Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS ENvTL. L. & POL'Y J. 65, 67 (Fall 2006) ("[C]ourts
have continued to engage in, and commentators to advocate, meaningful judicial review
of agency changes of direction in rulemaking.").
153 Robin McCall, Note, Dogs vs. Birds: Negotiated Rulemaking at Fort Funston, 13
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 187, 203 (2007) ("[Wihen an agency makes a
rule, it accepts public input and then makes the rule under its own discretion.").
154 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also WEST, supra note 149, at 78.
155 See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight:
Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 227,227 (1995).
156 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 35-37.
157 Adam N. Brain, Note, Public Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute to
Environmental Injustice, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 145, 159 (1996) (asserting
that processes "that provide little more than notice, opportunities for comment, or a right
to litigate frequently fail to accomplish the goals of citizen involvement"),
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
real consensus-building' 58 and the interaction rarely goes beyond one-way
transfers of information. 159 As a result, most of the resulting rules must
undergo judicial review because of challenges by unsatisfied groups.160
Noting the inherent defects of adversarial procedures 161 and the
widespread use of consensus-based mechanisms in the private sector and the
courts, 162 Congress supplemented conventional rulemaking with opportunity
for more proactive stakeholder involvement 163  under structured,
nonadversarial structures. 164 This mechanism therefore promotes 165 the
established 166 practice of involving citizens in drafting proposals. 167 Under
this structure, the stakeholders create the proposed rule through negotiation
and the officials retain the ultimate decision on whether to implement it.1 68
158 McCall, supra note 153, at 203 (describing the "hands off' approach taken in
rulemaking where "[t]he agency does not sit down and hammer out a consensus with
members of the public, regardless of the importance of their interests" and where the
agency only needs to aim for reasonableness).
159 Bram, supra note 157, at 164 ("[T]he information often passes only one way.
The agency is either giving information or taking information. Seldom does the
information exchange as dialogue.").
160 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 3 ("Most regulations issued by
agencies such as the EPA lead to adjudication from competing concerns as being too
tough or not tough enough.").
161 5 U.S.C. § 561 NOTE, Section 2 Findings (3) (2000) ("Adversarial rulemaking
deprives the affected parties and the public of the benefits of face-to-face negotiations
and cooperation in developing and reaching agreement on a rule. It also deprives them of
the benefits of shared information, knowledge, expertise, and technical abilities possessed
by the affected parties.").
162 See Charles Pou, Jr., Federal ADR and Negotiated Rulemaking Acts Receive
Permanent Reauthorization, 22 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4,4 (1997).
163 Bram, supra note 157, at 163.
164 Williams, supra note 77, at 149.
165 5 U.S.C. § 561 NOTE, Section 2 Findings (6) ("The process has not been widely
used by other agencies, however, in part because such agencies are unfamiliar with the
process or uncertain as to the authority for such rulemaking.").
166 Id. (stating that by the time the Negotiated Rulemaking Act came into force,
"[s]everal agencies [had] successfully used negotiated rulemaking").
167 Johnson, supra note 145, at 446 (describing the established practice of "informal
rulemaking" wherein "an agency generally drafts a proposed regulation internally based
on staff recommendations, or recommendations of committees or groups formed to
research an issue within the jurisdiction of the agency").
168 McCall, supra note 153, at 203.
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Because mediation is a proven method of avoiding litigation169 and
effectively addressing multiple concerns, 170 its use in negotiated rulemaking
is a logical solution to the inefficiencies that face the rulemaking process.
17 1
Thus, mediation among interested parties is applied to public policy
decisions under negotiated rulemaking in order to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of agency decisionmaking.
The benefits of negotiated rulemaking are manifold. First, the regulations
developed by this process are of a higher quality than those developed by
strictly adversarial means. When employed in the appropriate disputes,
negotiated rulemaking can bring polarized interests to a consensus over
policy issues 172 and therefore often creates more acceptable policies. 173 This
process presents a "golden opportunity" for interest groups to have direct
control over public policy. 174 Also, negotiated rulemaking expands the
potential for creativity in creating widely-acceptable regulations. 175 Finally,
negotiated rulemaking also has the potential to make the rulemaking process
more efficient by smoothing out difficulties and preventing unnecessary
adjudication. 176 So far, many potential participants continue to have an
ingrained adversarial mindset 177 and exhibit discomfort with cooperative
169 Richard M. Cartier, Mediating Local Intergovernmental Disputes-Reflections
on the Process, 13 SANJALR 1, 2 (2003) ("A successful mediation can help parties
avoid the acrimony associated with litigation.").
170 Mott, supra note 92, at 205.
171 From notice and comment procedures and liberal judicial review that overwhelm
the system. See WEST, supra note 149, at 51 ("[N]otice-and-comment
provisions... guarantee that interested parties will have the right to submit written or
oral comments on the merits of proposed rules."); id. at 48 ("[A]ffected persons could
hold officials accountable through challenge by judicial review.").
172 Williams, supra note 77, at 150.
173 Id. at 150.
174 McCall, supra note 153, at 204.
175 Williams, supra note 77, at 151 ("By increasing the use of consensual processes
to resolve public disputes, 'parties can find solutions to problems that cannot be addressed
by judicial remedies' and 'can achieve results ... that would be difficult or impossible to
obtain through adjudicatory processes."').
176 Johnson, supra note 145, at 447 ("The rationale behind negotiated rulemaking is
that the negotiation process will make the remaining parts of the notice and comment
process run smoother, and there will be less objection to the proposed rule because the
key stakeholders affected by the rule helped draft it.").
177 pou, supra note 162, at 14 ("[I]n many enforcement agencies and in
others.., adversarial relations with regulated parties, contractors, grant recipients,
advocacy groups, or even employee unions are still ingrained.").
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processes, 178 limiting the application of this beneficial process. 179 Despite
some initial reservation, Congress now fully accepts these consensual
methods as beneficial tools in policymaking, 18° and rulemakers use
negotiated rulemaking in creating many successful policies. 181 Thus, while
mediation is no panacea, 182 "in appropriate circumstances, consensual
settlement processes may . . . resolve public disputes with greater
effectiveness than traditional judicial and administrative adjudication." 183
The success experienced by the administrative branch with negotiated
rulemaking predicts similar results in the legislative branch with interest
group mediation. Interest groups must lobby executive agencies to make sure
the bills that they pushed through the legislature are correctly implemented
once enacted into law. 184 As a result, the stakeholders that create regulations
in negotiated rulemaking are largely the same interest groups that lobby
Congress. 185 The participants of this proposed process are therefore familiar
with, or at least aware of, consensual policymaking. The parallel between the
rulemaking and legislation processes, 186 and the use of the same groups that
comprise the mediated committees under negotiated rulemaking,187 leads to
178 Id. ("Many steps remain to be taken if these consensus methods of
decisionmaking are to gain the kind of broad-based acceptance and use throughout the
government that they merit.").
179 Williams, supra note 77, at 150 ("[T]he overall use of these procedures has been
somewhat limited.").
180 See McCall, supra note 153, at 203 ("Congress prefers agencies to use reg-neg
when it 'enhances the informal rulemaking process."'); see also Pou, supra note 162, at 4
("Congress, along with many federal agencies, have moved beyond an initial skepticism
and concern over potential abuses to a point where they have begun to view ADR
methods as safe and effective.").
181 See case studies summarized in McCall, supra note 153, at 204-06 (2007); see
also Williams, supra note 77, at 149 ("[T]he EPA has used [these consensual methods] in
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, and various other environmental regulations to great success.").
182 Williams, supra note 77, at 150 ("While clearly not a panacea, environmental
mediation should play an increasingly important role in resolving... environmental
disputes.").
183 Id.
18 4 See BRUCE C. WOLPE & BERTRAM J. LEVINE, LOBBYING CONGRESS: How THE
SYSTEM WORKS 69 (2d ed. 1996); see also Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 155.
185 Williams, supra note 77, at 148 ("[I]nterest groups that lobbied hard during the
bill-drafting stage are very likely to remain involved in the administrative rulemaking
process.").
186 See WEST, supra note 149, at 36.
187 Coglianese, supra note 141, at 1257.
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the logical inference that a similar process to negotiated rulemaking will
work in Congress. Thus, negotiated rulemaking serves as an example of the
success of mediation among interest groups in creating policy and promises
similar results for congressional lobbying.
B. Public Dispute Resolution
State and local legislatures commonly use mediation through the general
practice of public dispute resolution. Public policy disputes can be
complicated matters that affect a variety of interests 188 beyond legal rights
189
and require high levels of technical expertise. 190 Affected interests bring
these battles to legislatures because litigation is an ineffective forum for
complicated, interest-focused disputes. 191 Faced with such a problem, the
legislature may feel in over its head and decide to abandon traditional
deliberative filters for an opportunity to structure cooperation among the
petitioning interests. 192 Though a variety of collaborative mechanisms are
available, 193 public dispute resolution often involves mediated negotiation
among stakeholder representatives to create agreements that the government
then adopts as public policy. 194
Under this process, a neutral mediator gathers affected parties and
facilitates consensus on public policy. 195 The mediator is crucial because,
without his or her assistance, the parties would not be able to work out an
agreement. 196 Typically, public policy disputes involve division in the
188 Center for the Resolution of Disputes, http://www.cfrdmediation.com/public-
policy.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2007) ("Public Policy disputes can involve many parties
with differing points of view."); see also SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY,
MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND
REACHING AGREEMENTS 5 (1988).
189 Williams, supra note 77, at 136 (stating that these issues "involve much more
than legal rights").
190 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 188, at 5-6.
191 Williams, supra note 77, at 135 ("A comparison of the typical public policy
disputes within the general private civil suit reveals the shortcomings of litigation as a
tool for resolving public conflict.").
192 See Case Study: Legislature Uses Mediation to Craft Illinois
Telecommunications Act, 8 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 1 (Winter 2002).
193 See case studies cited infra notes 204-20.
194 Carri Hulet, A Glossary of Deliberative Democracy Terms, 12 DIsP. RESOL.
MAG. 27, 27 (Winter 2006).
195 Center for the Resolution of Disputes, supra note 188.
196 SUSSKIND & CRU1KSHANK, supra note 24, at 137-38.
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community, miscommunication, and distorted perceptions. 197 However, by
enlisting the active involvement and support of local interests, this process
creates policies that fully satisfy the community and elected officials. 198
Common disputes that are handled under public dispute resolution include
environmental issues, 199 zoning,200 public nuisances, 20 1 and other conflicts
that involve the allocation of resources 202 or complex, multilateral
negotiations. 203
Though mediated, face-to-face negotiations among interest groups are
untested in Congress, various state legislature have used these practices to
notable success. The three examples below illustrate how and why mediation
leads to improved results in public policymaking. The first example concerns
public policy over the telecommunications industry in Illinois. 204 In 2001, the
Illinois General Assembly faced the task of crafting a new
telecommunications policy that addressed competing interests in the field.20 5
With input coming from corporations, citizens, and experts, the House
Speaker decided to depart from the traditional committee model and use a
third-party neutral to mediate a multiparty joint session of stakeholders. 20 6
The neutral addressed this conflict with "traditional mediation, alternating
between joint sessions and private caucuses" in order to facilitate discussion
between the legal decisionmakers and the technical experts and support them
as they jointly drafted the legislation.207 The product of these efforts was a
bill that creatively addressed various interests and received overwhelming
support in passing both houses. In retrospect, "months of mediation and
197 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 188, at 12-15.
198 See Stephen R. Marsh, Public Policy Mediation (2000),
http://adrr.com/adr3/public.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
199 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 54-59.
200 The Center for the Resolution of Disputes, supra note 188 (citing examples
including an "agreement on a comprehensive revision of the Hamilton County, Ohio
Zoning Code" and an "agreement on revisions to the hospital zoning restrictions").
201 Id. (citing, for example, an "agreement on regulations to govern the disposal of
construction and demolition debris in Ohio").
202 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 17.
203 Erbe, supra note 103, at 379 ("Mediation's facilitated consensus-building
benefits more complex conflicts involving diverse stakeholders and long-term
relationships.").
204 Case Study: Legislature Uses Mediation to Craft Illinois Telecommunications
Act, supra note 192, at 1.
205 Id.
206 Id.
2 0 7 ld at 2.
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negotiation helped to expedite the legislative process and produce a fair,
well-balanced bill that set the foundation for a new telecommunication policy
throughout Illinois." 208 Thus, mediation among affected interests proved to
be an effective, efficient process in addressing this public policy dispute.
The second example involves a zoning dispute between the city of
Draper, Utah, and the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City over the
creation of a water treatment facility.209 After the parties reached deadlock
on acceptable use of the land, the dissatisfied side sought an exemption from
the zoning requirements in the state legislature. 2 10 This action brought
protective action from parties satisfied with the status quo, leading the
legislature to become the battleground for this issue. The result was a
"lobbying blitz" from the affected parties and hours of time spent on floor
debates as the bill crawled through traditional legislative processes.211
Throughout this conflict, the disputants became emotional and frustrated,
while the "legislators felt trapped in a fight that all acknowledged they were
poorly equipped to address."2 12
In response to this dire situation, House Committee Chair Kory
Holdaway agreed to the sponsor's request that the problem be addressed by a
working group composed of representatives of various affected groups that
would seek to bring conflicting interests to voluntary consensus.213 Under
this collaborative process, the discussion evolved to a focus on the broader
question of how best to address the conflict. 214 The groups identified issues,
explored options, revised approaches, and reached consensus with ideas from
all participants. 215 Though the conflict was complicated and involved many
affected interests, the working group was able to generate consensus that was
translated into an effective and wide-reaching policy.2 16
Another example involved a bipartisan, bicameral task force created to
address the impending boom in the need for long-term care for seniors in
208 Id.
209 Case Study: Utah Legislature Builds Consensus, Policy Consensus E-News 1
(Apr. 2004), http://www.poticyconsensus.org/casestudies/docs/UT Legislature.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008).
210 Id.
211 Id
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1-2.
2 14 Id. at2.
215 Case Study: Utah Legislature Builds Consensus, supra note 209, at 2.
2 16 Id. at3.
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Minnesota. 217 In order to organize stakeholder participation within this
structure, the task force "retained a neutral third party with ... expertise in
health care . . . [who] facilitated discussions and provided an essential link
between task force members and the stakeholder groups."218 The task force
heard from experts, members of the public, and organized focus groups, and
then effectively conveyed the information to the legislature as a whole.219
Through the collaborative participation of stakeholders, the legislature was
able to create an innovative, effective policy. In commenting on her
experiences as a member of the task force, Minnesota State Senator Shelia
Kiscaden, claimed that they "had a great deal of success using work groups,
joint task forces, and facilitated discussions to arrive at decisions on tough
issues" and that "these approaches have enabled us to find common ground,
and at the same time, streamline our decision-making process. 220
C. How Consensus-Based Approaches Arise
The above mechanisms reveal conclusions as to why governments adopt
consensus-based approaches to policymaking. Negotiated rulemaking arose
out of the inefficiency of giving weight to individual interests through open,
multiparty participation and liberal judicial review. Public dispute resolution
is a natural development in state legislatures that are overburdened with
petitioning interests and technical information. The similarity between these
programs is that they both arise from the stresses of dealing with pressures
from diverse interests. In order to address individual concerns in complicated
disputes, these new processes abandon traditional, adversarial approaches in
favor of innovative, consensual methods. The lobbying crisis is a parallel
situation of government structures being overburdened with petitioning
interests and facing the negative consequences of this pressure. The lobbying
issue, therefore, is reason and incentive for Congress to adopt greater use of
consensus-based mechanisms.
217 Case Study: Minnesota Legislature Collaborates to Reform Long Term Care,
Policy Consensus E-News 1 (2000),
http://www.policyconsensus.org/casestudies/docs/MNHealthcare.pdf (last visited Mar.
5, 2008).
2 18 Id. at 1-2.
2 19 Id. at2.
2 2 0 Id.
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While existing practices of public policy mediation2 2 1 and literature on
conducting such processes 222 provide guidance for interest group mediation,
the policy must be tailored to fit congressional structures. In order to
implement the beneficial process described above, Congress must decide
how it will bring parties to the negotiating table and then adopt the resulting
agreements.
A. Initiating the Mediation
There are two possible methods for initiating interest group mediation
that are not mutually exclusive. First, the parties, on their own accord, may
initiate the process under a jointly-hired, private mediator. Second, Congress
may organize the process and compel interest groups to participate in lieu of
lobbying.
Interest groups that are competing over a policy may realize that their
adversarial tactics are costly and inefficient,223 especially in the case of
mutual defensive lobbying,224 and that cooperation and self-determination
may better serve their well-being. 225 These interest groups may want to
spend less on lobbying, which cannot guarantee beneficial outcomes, 226 and
hire a private lobbyist-mediator that is familiar with congressional practices,
experienced in policy dispute resolution, and neutral as to the issue at
hand.22 7 If the parties reconcile their differing interests and reach agreement
on a proposal, Congress will likely adopt it and further conflicting lobbying
221 See supra Part IV.
222 See SUSSKiND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24.
223 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 188, at 26.
224 See supra Part II.B (describing defensive lobbying as the hiring of lobbyists to
undermine future adverse action or protect past gains in the legislature).
225 James R. Coben, Gollum Meet Smagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on
Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 65, 76 (2004) (noting that nothing "could honor the free market more efficiently
than corporate players freeing themselves of legislative and court mandates" by reaching
private agreement).
226 SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 16, at 301 (stating that "[w]hether or not they
have the political clout to pass a bill," the lobbyist can guarantee information. Thus, they
can guarantee information but not outcome.).
227 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 139.
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will be precluded. 228 Thus, the parties may act on their own initiative to save
costs and create deals with the guidance of a mediator. However, because
parties to these disputes are conditioned to think adversarially 229 and feel the
need to maintain tough, non-cooperative public postures, 230 this voluntary
cooperation is currently unlikely.23' The remainder of this Note will
therefore expand on the second option-mandatory mediation among the
interest groups-and the procedures necessary to effect this structure.
Congress may effectively compel lobbying interests into mediation
without hindering lobbyist activity. Once a group spends a certain amount on
lobbying, as revealed under disclosure laws,232 it may be compelled to
mediate with opposing interests under congressional discretion.233 Congress
may effectively convene multiparty mediations under the power of the House
Rules Committee.234 Doing so requires identifying key players, making sure
the power relationships are adequately balanced, making sure that there is a
legitimate spokesperson for each interest, setting deadlines, and framing the
dispute. 235 The participants in these discussions should be the leaders236 or
direct representatives of the affected groups and not the lobbyists. 237 The
228 Zeinemann, supra note 69, at 53 (stating that "decision-makers almost always
accept consensus accords"); see also Dunn, supra note 72 (noting that legislatures prefer
it when parties work out the problems themselves).
229 See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 188, at 26.
230 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 137, 140.
231 Id. at 138 ("[T]he overriding reality is that these parties are unlikely to resolve
their dispute without help.").
232 LUNEBURG & SUSMAN, supra note 47, at 7.
233 In common mandatory mediation programs, the "legislatures authorized courts to
mandate mediation and the courts are exercising that power" as applied to legal disputes.
Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on
Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 101, 104. However, here the legislature is
authorizing itself the power to mandate mediation of legislative disputes.
234 Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 220 (1984) (describing the power of the House Rules Committee as an "array
of agenda control devices").
235 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 189-92.
236 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 33 (advocating participation of senior
executives of businesses because they are "knowledgeable about their business,
influential in industry, and respected in community").
237 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 11 (advocating "face-to-face
interaction among specially chosen representatives of all 'stakeholding' groups").
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stakeholders are more knowledgeable as to their particular interests, 238 and
lobbyists would object to a mandatory procedure that would disrupt their
normal activities. 239 The mediator should be qualified,240 familiar with
congressional practices, 241 neutral as to the dispute,242 and may be chosen by
the parties. 243 Thus, interest group mediation would require a new
congressional subcommittee on mediation under the House Rules Committee
that would chose appropriate disputes for mediation244 and convene
representatives of all affected interests245 for negotiations under the guidance
of a competent, respected mediator.
Congress would apply this duty to mediate under a statute or a
congressional rule that could subject any interest group or corporation that
reaches a certain level of lobbying expenditures to mediation under the
subcommittee's discretion.246 This mechanism would have the advantage of a
contractual mediation clause by creating a degree of consent in conditioning
the mechanism on voluntary lobbying activity. Also, in directing attention to
disputes that are serious enough to enter the lobbying-expenditure threshold,
238 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 32 (advising lobbyists to involve their
clients in the actual process because "no one understands the client's business better than
the client").
239 Dunn, supra note 72 (disagreeing with the idea of mediation as the only avenue,
arguing that this would obstruct lobbyist activities in a way that would work to preserve
the status quo).
240 Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment
Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 881 (2002) (stating that "mediators must have
qualifications necessary to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the parties").
241 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 150 (stating that the mediators
chosen "usually need to be quite conversant with the ways in which the public sector
operates").
242 Id. at 138-39.
243 Id. at 197.
244 Andreas Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework, 7 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 287, 288 (1992) ("Legislatures, courts, and parties mandating
mediation for certain controversies must confront two questions: first, whether the
controversy is suitable for mediation; and second, whether it is appropriate to mandate
mediation of the controversy."). For an example of typical criteria, see Zeinemann, supra
note 69, at 61.
245 Brain, supra note 157, at 159 (stating in a discussion of public participation
provisions that "Congress must enact statutory provisions that spare rhetoric and actually
guarantee all affected citizens opportunities for meaningful public participation").
246 Nelle, supra note 244, at 300 ("At least three different ways to establish a duty to
mediate exist: by a general rule (statute or court rule), by individual referral (by a court),
or by a contractual mediation clause.").
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the program would be tailored to address situations where it would be most
beneficial. 247
In light of the irrational barriers to consensual negotiation, this coercive
mechanism may be helpful in initiating mediation of legislative disputes. 248
First, mandatory mediation is the best way to overcome the non-cooperative
public posturing 249 that commonly prevents cooperation among interest
groups.250 In fact, this procedure helps the parties by allowing them to
maintain a tough appearance to their constituents while fully participating in
cooperative discussions.251 Compelling mediation is also an effective way to
address non-communication among parties. 252 Because the affected interests
often do not communicate with opposing interest groups 253 or opposing
Congresspeople, 254 mandatory mediation may be necessary in replacing
indirect communication through lobbyists255 with more beneficial direct
communication. 256 Mandatory mediation may also overcome the "agency
problem" of lobbyists potentially opposing cooperation as a threat to their
highly lucrative market on indirect influence. 257 Just as lawyers may oppose
time-efficient mediation practices as a threat to their monetary interests, so
may lobbyists oppose interest group mediation. 258 Thus, compulsory
mediation can serve as an effective tool for bringing parties together.
247 Id. at 301 (Individual evaluations "can adjust the duty to the circumstances of the
case... The screening can at the same time be used to screen out cases in which even
voluntary mediation may be undesirable.").
248 Id. at 294 (asserting that mandating mediation is justified only if there are
barriers preventing the use of mediation in cases that would benefit from it, and if
mandating mediation is the least intrusive measure of overcoming these barriers).
249 Id. at 296 (stating that "mandatory mediation may be the best way to break the
impasse" in this situation).
250 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 137.
251 Id. at 140.
252 Nelle, supra note 244, at 295 ("Deficient communication can be both a
substantive and a procedural obstacle to agreement... a duty to mediate can overcome
this obstacle.").
253 See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 188, at 13.
254 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 44.
255 See SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 16, at 300 (stating that advocacy groups
"filter and process both information and policy preferences").
256 Bram, supra note 157, at 163 ("Congress' move... toward proactive
involvement techniques is a positive sign.").
257 See supra Part II.
258 Nelle, supra note 244, at 295 ("[A]ttomeys will eschew mediation not just
because of skepticism, but because of their self-interest, even where it conflicts with the
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Though potentially coercive in initiating the mediation, this mechanism
is not problematic to the stakeholders, lobbyists, or the system. The
stakeholders may be compelled to enter the mediation, but this in no way
creates coercion in coming to an agreement. 259 Mandatory mediation creates
an illusion of loss of control, but parties retain their veto power over the
proposals and their ability to walk away from an unacceptable situation.260
Also, because a subcommittee will choose disputes that are appropriate for
mediation, the stakeholders will not be forced into a process that works
against their interests. 261 The best argument against standard mandatory
mediation programs is that they deny weaker parties the formal protection of
litigation 262 and the legal vindication of their rights.263 However, interest
group mediation does not remove protections of formal litigation, inherently
involves interests rather than legal rights,264 and may lessen the effects of
power imbalances. 265 Finally, this process will not obstruct the normal
client's interests. This conflict of interest or 'agency problem' may be quite pervasive. The
flipside of mediation's potential for reducing legal costs is a threat to lawyers' revenues."
A similar danger is posed by lobbyists that are agents to stakeholders as lawyers are
agents of disputants.).
259 Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: All Mediations are Voluntary, but Some Are More Voluntary than Others, 26
JUST. Sys. J. 273, 278 (2005) (quoting Frank Sander, "I believe there is a clear distinction
between coercion into mediation and coercion in mediation."); see also Bingham, supra
note 240, at 882-83 ("[S]cholars distinguish between self-determination as to process and
as to the outcome of that process.").
260 SuSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 138.
261 Hedeen, supra note 259, at 278 ("[T]o say 'You have to try this process because
in our judgment'-the legislature's or judge's judgment--'this may be a good case for
attempted settlement,' that seems to me all right.") (quoting Frank Sander).
262 Timothy K. Kuhner, Court-Connected Mediation Compared: The Cases of
Argentina and the United States, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 550 (2005)
(advocating "legislatures considering mandatory mediation laws to contemplate the
unintended effects of diverting cases from litigation to mediation").
263 Nelle, supra note 244, at 293 ("The reason mediation is ineffective in these
circumstances is that mediation does not emphasize rights (which might empower the
weaker party) and has a tendency to preserve power imbalances.").
264 Mediation is "particularly well-suited for dealing with interest-centered
controversies or for reorienting disputes towards reconciling interests." Nelle, supra note
244, at 292.
265 It does this by removing stakeholders from a system controlled by various
sources of power (information, money, access) and focusing on interests. Also, public
policy mediation can lessen the effects of power disparities by ensuring protective rules
to the weaker parties and convincing more powerful parties of the disadvantages of
nonparticipation. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 144.
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activities of lobbyists because the participants will be stakeholders. 266 These
participants will retain the services of their lobbyists, who remain entirely
necessary for their ability to gather and facilitate information, 267 but will not
need the lobbyists to cajole legislators once agreement is reached among the
affected interests in mediation.268 Therefore, mandatory mediation would not
coerce stakeholders or interfere with standard lobbying activity.
To enforce the duty to mediate on the chosen interest groups, Congress
must use visible, effective, yet proportionate sanctions for noncompliance. 269
Groups that refuse to participate may have their lobbying expenditures
restricted or suspended. The mediator may also report groups that act in bad
faith to the House Rules Committee, which has the power to delay or
expedite congressional consideration of proposals against the wishes of the
bad faith participants. 270 However, these sanctions may be largely
unnecessary because initiation is the easier phase of the process,271 and
organizers can usually convince the stakeholders to participate voluntarily. 272
Thus, a subcommittee under the House Rules Committee can designate
appropriate disputes for mediation and can effectively bring the stakeholders
to the mediation without burdening affected interests.
B. Enacting Agreements
A mechanism must also be in place to enact the agreement into law. If
the accord is directly enacted, Congress loses its "legislative sovereignty 273
266 Dunn, supra note 72 (voicing concern that mediation among interests would
interfere with lobbyists' normal functions by creating a distracting, burdensome
procedural requirement).
267 See WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 44; see also SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra
note 16, at 149.
268 See infra Part V.B (discussing the effects of the yes-or-no vote).
269 Nelle, supra note 244, at 305.
270 Bruff, supra note 234, at 220.
271 SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 137.
272 Id. at 140 (stating that a convener can "spend a substantial amount of time
meeting with potential stakeholders to convince them that a negotiated approach can
work").
273 David E. Skaggs, How Can Parliamentary Participation in WTO Rule-Making
and Democratic Control be Made More Effective in the WTO?: A United States
Congressional Perspective, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 655, 656 (2004).
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to the special interests and cannot protect the public good. 274 However, if
Congress retains the right to amend the mediated agreement, then adversarial
lobbying among the interest groups will reemerge, 275 and parties, therefore,
will have no reason to negotiate a consensus in the first place.276 The
adoption procedure must ensure that the outcome that the parties decide
remains intact without denying Congress the right to exercise discretion.
To balance these interests, the stakeholders will present their mediated
agreements to Congress for a yes-or-no vote without amendment. The first
benefit of this mechanism is that it preserves the credibility of the mediation
process. Negotiating parties will not consent to agreements that may become
less favorable with congressional tampering. 277 Preserving the agreement,
therefore, creates credibility278 and is indispensable to bringing the parties
together 279 and conducting the negotiation process. 280 Furthermore, this
mechanism preserves appropriate congressional oversight and discretion. As
274 See Cristin Kent, Condemned if They Do, Condemned if They Don't: Eminent
Domain, Public Use Abandonment, and the Need for Condemnee Protections, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 503, 507 (2007).
275 William J. Davey, The WTO: Looking Forwards, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3, 7 n.17
(2006) (stating that unless it limits its powers, "Congress will be unable to restrain itself
from amending key parts of the agreement").
276 Natalie R. Minter, Note, Fast Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon
Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 107, 109 (1995)
(stating that parties whose agreements must be enacted by Congress "could not credibly
negotiate in a situation where Congress could unravel a completed agreement by rejecting
or amending any specific provision of it").
277 Wright, supra note 68, at 994 (stating that negotiating parties "must have
credibility when negotiating" because conflicting interests will not commit to a process
that "does not have the authority to enact the agreements").
278 Id. (describing the prohibition of amendments to agreements in fast track
authority and how this mechanism "empower[s] the President to negotiate bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements" because it "gives the President credibility at the
international negotiating table").
279 Id. at 997 (describing the effectiveness of similar fast track authority and how
"countries that had previously indicated an interest in negotiating ... with the United
States abandoned those plans after fast track expired" and how, once fast track was
brought back, "those countries have again expressed a willingness to begin
negotiations").
280 Clete D. Johnson, Note, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World?
Presidential "Trade Promotion Authority" and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture
Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 439 (2004) (stating that
in order to present an agreement for Congressional approval, "a yes-or-no vote, without
the possibility of amendment ... is indispensable for the completion of complex
[negotiations]").
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long as it retains the power to vote on the proposal, Congress may delegate
the power to create the substance of legislation 281 and still preserve its proper
role.282 For example, denying amendments on negotiated agreements and
seeking simple yes-or-no approval is a beneficial congressional practice
under "fast track authority." 283 This mechanism gives credibility to American
negotiators in making trade deals 284 and provides for efficient, expedient
adoption of the agreement in the parties' interests 285 within constitutional
boundaries. 286
Furthermore, this mechanism will reduce lobbying pressure. Because
Congress has limited discretion in fast track diplomacy, there is much less of
a reason to lobby legislators over these proposals. 287 The lobbying pressure
will be further reduced because both sides of the debate naturally support
their agreement. Furthermore, this mechanism may have a moderating
influence on the negotiated solution. Because the stakeholders know that the
agreements they produce must pass congressional approval, they may create
moderate, acceptable proposals to save their hard work from rejection.288
This means that opposing groups will avoid compromises that appease both
extremes but repulse the general public. Requiring congressional approval
while precluding amendments will therefore create acceptable policy and
diminish lobbying pressure.
281 Wright, supra note 68, at 998 (considering fast track trade authority, "the courts
have recognized that Congress must be permitted to delegate some of its powers in order
to be able to function").
282 Minter, supra note 276, at 114 (stating that under the tested practice of fast track
trade promotion authority, "Congress maintains its authority to work its will on
legislation and its role in trade negotiations is safeguarded").
283 Johnson, supra note 280, at 439 (describing this mechanism as "an innovative
constitutional device that allows the president to present to Congress a completed trade
agreement for a yes-or-no vote, without the possibility of amendment").
284 Davey, supra note 275, at 7 (stating that "US negotiators will not be able to
make credible commitments in the absence of trade promotion authority ('fast-track')").
285 Minter, supra note 276, at 108 (stating that "fast track is a legislative procedure
designed to ensure expedient and efficient consideration of trade agreements").
286 Id. at 110 ("[I]f we look to the sections of the Constitution that define the powers
of the legislative and the executive branches of government, we find that fast track
procedures preserve Congress' role.").
287 Wright, supra note 68, at 996 ("The 'all or nothing' methodology of fast-track
procedures reduces the pressure on representatives by special-interest groups.").
288 John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial
Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REv. 153, 193 (1993) (One "advantage of the representation filter
is its moderating effect. In theory, at least, elected representatives have a duty to govern
on behalf of all their constituents.").
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Thus, in adopting the outcomes of the stakeholder mediations, Congress
should consider these agreements without amendment. Presenting unchanged
mediated agreements for simple yes-or-no congressional approval provides
credibility for negotiating participants, preserves the appropriate role and
powers of Congress, and creates a moderating influence on the discussions.
In conclusion, interest group mediation is an operationally feasible proposal.
Implementing it would require a Mediation Subcommittee under the House
Rules Committee and a voting mechanism that prohibits amendments on
proposals negotiated by interest groups. These structures are not burdensome
and are, therefore, entirely worth the potential benefits of this process.
VI. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Apart from the specific problem of lobbying reform, the above proposal
may have implications for the optimal use of lobbyists in Congress and even
broader implications for the practice of democracy under modem conditions.
Perhaps the lobbying boom is a symptom of a greater problem, and maybe
consensus-based policymaking can create benefits outside of efficient
lobbying practices.
A. Optimal Lobbying Practices in Congress
Though public attention focuses on the corruption with which it is
associated, lobbying has many positive aspects. The facilitating effect of
lobbying makes it necessary to the functioning of the congressional system
and consensus-building among conflicting interests. Lobbying reform has
failed to promote this function because it uses broad disclosure laws instead
of targeting the problematic elements of lobbyist practices. 289 However,
interest group mediation allows for and promotes productive aspects of
lobbying while decreasing corruption and inefficiency. Therefore, this
proposal offers an organizational structure that is currently missing from the
field of lobbying and may lead to optimal lobbying efforts.
Through their interaction with a diverse range of people in Washington,
lobbyists have much to offer the system and its players in facilitating
communication.290 Despite evidence of corruption and inefficiency in the
289 See supra Part II.C.
290 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 44 (stating that unlike the legislators who
have little contact outside their party and committees, the lobbyist "has a more complete
overview of the political landscape" and can see these things developing).
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influence industry, 291 proponents of current lobbying practice argue that
lobbying is a source of information rather than problems. 292 Clients benefit
from lobbying activities such as monitoring congressional activity293 and
providing members of Congress with information that supports their
positions.294 However, the system as a whole also benefits because members
of Congress receive digestible amounts of information from their
supporters295 and reliable reconnaissance on the actions of opposing
politicians and interest groups.296
Though they seem to mostly benefit the system, these actions directly
serve the clients that fund them because of the following dynamic: Members
of Congress are faced with an insurmountable amount of data and have little
contact with fellow members.297 Because legislators do not communicate
with most of their fellow members, they require updates on the actions of
other players in order to give informed consent in voting for a proposal. 298
To be persuasive, lobbyists must provide legislators with trustworthy
information about the support and opposition they will face in taking the
lobbyist's position. Thus, by gathering and distributing helpful information
for members of Congress, lobbyists serve the interests of their clients.
Furthermore, by gathering this information, lobbyists obtain a superior
overview of the political landscape 299 and use this advantage to serve as
291 See supra Part II.B.
292 Termini, supra note 42, at 1038 ("Lobbyists facilitate this information processing
by providing pertinent facts, rather than persuasive threats. In this light, lobbying as an
information transmission process may be a necessary lubricant to effective lawmaking.").
293 SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 16, at 149; see also Bimbaum, supra note 4.
294 Michael T. Heaney, Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties, and Interest
Group Influence, 31 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 887, 898 (2006) ("For example, the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America lobbies Congress by providing information about the
health benefits and risks of contraceptive technologies.").
295 SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 16, at 300.
296 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 35-36; see also SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra
note 16, at 310 (describing lobbyists as communications links among members of
Congress).
297 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 44 (describing how members of Congress
have very limited contact outside "their committees and particularly their party's
colleagues on that committee").
298 Id. at 35-36; see also SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 16, at 292 (explaining how
members of Congress rely on the advice of others in making most of their decisions and
why this is a valid practice).
299 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 44.
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congressional go-betweens that organize the agenda3°° and conduct political
trades.30' As a result, the role of lobbyists has expanded from being only
informational links between legislators and their constituents 302 to being the
internal conduits by which Congress conducts its business.30 3 Therefore,
lobbyists are privately-provided agents that serve a necessary public
function.
But what of the valid criticisms of lobbying as a corrupt, inefficient
means of indirect influence? The reality is that both assertions are correct:
lobbying is problematic as a means of indirect influence, but it also remains
useful as a facilitator of information. The good news is that these functions
are detachable under the proposed mechanism of interest group mediation.
Lobbyists fully provide their normal information services, to the benefit of
their clients and the system, but they will also delegate advocacy in
appropriate circumstances to the stakeholders through a congressional
mechanism of facilitated negotiation. Thus, clients and Congress will receive
the quality and efficiency of consensual solutions without losing the
facilitative function of lobbyists.
Additionally, interest group mediation will preserve negotiated
agreements among conflicting interests. Though it does not receive much
attention compared to corruption in the practice, lobbyists assert that a
substantial amount of their work involves consensus-building. 30 4 However,
the lack of cooperative structures promoting these actions leaves the resulting
deals hindered and vulnerable when they are introduced into the adversarial,
congressional system. For example, after a lobbyist facilitates a compromise,
their client often reneges on the agreement; 305 or once a deal is pushed
through one house, a politician in the other house will undercut or amend the
bill.30 6 The influence of the adversarial deliberative system, therefore, works
against the unstructured collaboration that lobbyists conduct. Interest group
mediation seeks to fix this disorganized system by attaining commitment
300 SCHNEIER & GRoss, supra note 16, at 301.
301 Id. at 310.
302 Id. at 300.
303 Id. at 310.
304 Toman, supra note 97; Interview with Maggie Lewis, Associate Director, Ohio
Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management, Columbus, Ohio (July 17,
2007); Charles F. Abernathy, When Civil Rights Go Wrong: Agenda and Process in Civil
Rights Reform, 2 TEMP. POL. & CIrv. RTs. L. REv. 177, 194 (1993) (describing the
seriousness of one "issue for civil rights lobbyists because a great deal of their work
involves education and consensus building").
305 Toman, supra note 97.
306 Id.
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from interest groups and officially sanctioning and preserving the agreements
that they produce. With this mechanism, lobbyists will delegate their
consensus-building efforts to the parties to directly negotiate under a
mediator. This practice may be more effective because the parties are directly
involved in the negotiation and the agreements are better protected.
Therefore, this proposal may serve as an optimal structure for lobbying
practices. The service that lobbyists offer centers on expertise in working
through the government and relationships with these officials. 30 7 Optimal use
of their services would focus on the savvy that lobbyists have within the
government. 30 8 Lobbying becomes overextended and inefficient when the
lobbyist's clients could do the same work without government-specialized
advocates. By offering a secured structure for consensus-building, interest
group mediation empowers the affected interests to perform their own
negotiation and advocacy while retaining lobbyists to conduct the necessary
facilitation with the government actors. Thus, using the particular expertise
of lobbyists to supplement interest group interaction may encourage more
efficient use of these services. Interest group mediation, therefore, promises
to transform lobbying from a practice that dominates the system with secret
deals and political compromises 309 to a practice that only supplements the
more empowered efforts of interest groups.
B. Increasing Deliberative Democracy in Congress
The analysis of consensus-based approaches to current problems in
creating public policy touches upon more than the narrow issue of the
lobbying boom. Increased lobbying pressures and the difficulty that
legislatures currently experience with processing information may be
symptomatic of a more inherent defect in the system, and the solution offered
by collaborative policymaking may promise more than better lobbying
practices. In fact, these methods may affect the very concept of democracy in
modem congressional practice.
307 WOLPE & LEVINE, supra note 184, at 32 (stating that lobbyists are experts on the
people and processes of lawmaking); Toman, supra note 97.
308 Christopher E. Austin, Due Process, Court Access Fees, and the Right to
Litigate, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 768, 783 (1982) (discussing an example of creating
"functional efficiency by making the best use of expertise").
309 Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 470 (1999) ("[S]ecret deals between interest
group lobbyists, particular legislators, and agency decisionmakers seem not to qualify as
legitimate means of political influence.").
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A growing number of legal scholars are challenging the traditional model
of democratically elected government as outdated and unfit for dealing with
the complex, multiparty nature of modern public disputes. 3 10 Our forefathers
designed our democratic structure under a mindset of dualism and binary
patterns that relies on adversarial mechanisms such as courts, political
parties, and two-sided debates. 31' This simple structure fit a legislature
composed of twenty-six Senators and sixty-five Representatives, 3 12 all of
whom were white landowning males. 3 13 Such a system was able to
effectively address the less complex issues of the past with adversarial
deliberations. 3 14 However, modern problems are becoming increasingly
complicated, 3 15  involving many diverse parties and issues.3 16  As
congressional processes address more complicated issues from a wider range
of voices, the debate and deliberation upon which the system depends
lessens.3 17 Under these constraints of time and information,3 18 actual floor
debate is useful only as a method to enter the speaker's opinion into the
record, rather than a means to conduct a productive conversation or
debate. 319 Basically, the United States Congress was not designed to deal
310 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 69, at 347-48; see also MAYER, supra note 120, at
167-68.
311 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 69, at 347-48.
312 Dennis J. Tuchler, Has Congress Abdicated its Legislative Authority to its Stafi?,
19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 114 n.23 (2000) ("[B]oth houses were small enough
for one to imagine general thoughtful discussion of issues before them.").
313 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1228 n.145
(1984).
314 Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 21, at 326 ("Put simply, the earlier
Congresses had the luxury of discussing fewer and less complex issues than those facing
Congress in the modem era.").
315 Id. ("As America grew, the problems facing it became more complex, and the
House's workload increased.").
316 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 69, at 347-48.
317 Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 21, at 321.
318 Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian
Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1290 (2001) ("Despite the enormous growth of
congressional staff and the refined specialization of its internal structure, Congress faces
tight deliberative constraints of time and information.").
319 Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983) ("Structurally, both houses are large,
making the process of engaging in complex arguments during a floor debate difficult. For
the most part, the speeches made on the floor are designed to get a member's position on
the record rather than to initiate a dialogue.").
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with issues or parties that are as complicated as they are today.320 By
continuing to use adversarial, two-sided forums, modem democratic
policymakers respond to an overload of citizen input with inadequate
processes and insufficient outcomes. 321 Efforts to adapt through changes in
rules and procedures 322 are problematic because the traditional, adversarial
structures cannot be bent to fit modem needs.323 The resulting problem is
that, under the traditional structures, elected officials have difficulty
representing diverse interests in complicated disputes 324 and citizens have
difficulty taking legislative action other than blocking proposals. 325 This
problem leads to a perception of democracy as a cumbersome, inefficient
process.326
The solution to this problem is structured empowerment of
constituents327 such as mediated public policymaking. 328 This idea is the
product of the vision of political theory and the tools of conflict resolution.329
The political theory of deliberative democracy attempts to address the above
problems with representative democratic structures by considering ways to
320 Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 21, at 326 ("The deliberative process in
the twentieth century House is a far cry from what it was in Jefferson's day."); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 69, at 347 ("[T]he empirical world has changed greatly from the
times in which most of our legal and political institutions were conceptualized and
created.").
321 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125, at 19 (section on "Institutional gridlock").
322 Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 21, at 326 (stating that as the disputes
became more complex and workload increased, "[tihe membership and structure of the
House were forced to change accordingly").
323 Id. at 321-22 (1994) (discussing problems with Congress).
324 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 69, at 347-48 (arguing that binary, adversarial
methods may not be able to handle modem, complicated disputes); see also Solomon &
Wolfensberger, supra note 21, at 324 (discussing the decline in democratic deliberation
and how "the diminution of this scrutiny has contributed to the erosion of public
confidence in Congress").
325 See SUSSKiND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 3-8.
326 MAYER, supra note 120, at 167.
327 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 69, at 348 ("These problems may require input
from a multiplicity of constituencies and coordinated action by a multiplicity of legal and
political institutions."); see also MAYER, supra note 120, at 167-68 ("Effective conflict
resolution and collaborative problem-solving procedures can help this critical
participatory element of democracy work.").
328 See supra Part V.
329 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125.
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directly involve and enhance input from the polity.330 Conflict resolution
then provides the tools that are necessary to empower the parties to work
through complex disputes and create consensual policy. 331 In particular,
mediation presents a necessary tool in creating this level of democracy. 332
With its ability to bring opposing groups together and produce consensual
policy, mediation demonstrates an "internal democracy" that has unbridled
potential. 333 The use of mediation may therefore improve the political
process and restore faith in the government. 334 In addressing the flaws of our
representational system, conflict resolution can fix problems identified by
theories of deliberative democracy. However, government actors must see
these consensus processes as part of the system, working in tandem with
adversarial mechanisms, instead of independent and unofficial measures that
are used only as alternatives to traditional measures. 335
The proposed system of interest group mediation synthesizes the conflict
resolution tool of mediated policymaking in combination with the established
330 Hulet, supra note 194, at 27 ("In contrast to traditional political theories that
emphasize voting for elected representatives, deliberative democrats claim that, to
produce democratic outcomes, citizens should be involved directly in formulating public
policy and even in lawmaking."); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125, at 18 (describing the
focus of deliberative democracy as "how to enhance reasoned argument and deliberation
among members of the polity, principally in political decision-making").
331 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 125, at 18 ("[T]he conflict-resolution movement
has developed as an eclectic applied social science of both theory and practice, drawing
from planning, law, sociology, psychology, communications and decision sciences to
develop models of decision-making, dialogue and dispute settlement. Its process
embodiments include the primary ADR processes of negotiation, mediation, arbitration
and adjudication.").
332 Weinstein, supra note 67, at 35 ("One of the skills needed to interact in a
democracy is mediation that assists parties in resolving conflict while being respectful of
each person's interests.").
333 Erbe, supra note 103, at 415 ("Mediation's internal democracy, or good
governance, creates outcomes truly responsive to diverse needs at all levels of society
through consensus-building. Mediation has potential to transform broader society,
encouraging democracy through training citizens, impartially guiding power sharing,
effectively bridging cultural difference, building durable relationships and sustainable
solutions, and otherwise enhancing the parties' ability to work together efficiently and
effectively through, for example, ensuring requisite transparency and accountability.").
334 SussKiND & CRUiKsHANK, supra note 24, at 13.
335 MAYER, supra note 120, at 62 ("[Consensus-building approaches] can play a
useful role in promoting dialogue... But they need to be viewed as part of more
traditional policymaking procedures, not as independent from them."); see also SUSSKIND
& CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 11 ("[Consensus-building] approaches must be treated
as supplements-and not alternatives-to conventional decision making.").
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structure of lobbying to create a process for better deliberative democracy in
Congress. Interest group mediation creates issue-specific deliberative
democracy by directly involving the interests that form around certain issues.
Though the entire polity is not involved, the citizens that are affected by the
policy are represented by the diverse interest groups that lobby Congress.
And while some scholars attack consensus-based policymaking as forcing
compromise and obstructing the normal functioning of the government, 336
interest group mediation leaves legislatures and lobbyists unaffected by
focusing on the stakeholder interests upstream. The result is a coherent
system where affected stakeholders complement the efforts of
Congresspeople and lobbyists under an established mechanism for
cooperation. While consensus-based policymaking processes exist, they
either obstruct normal operations or, more frequently, receive marginal and
infrequent use.337 This proposal allows the consensus-based processes to
complement the adversarial approaches used by legislatures and lobbyists. 338
Interest group mediation therefore has the potential to enhance the
democratic value of the system by combining the benefits of adversarial and
cooperative modalities without the disadvantages associated with each.339
Thus, the proposed process has the potential to improve the democratic value
of congressional policy through direct involvement of interest groups under a
mediated framework.
Outside of the democratic value in our own system, Americans must also
be aware of the effectiveness of these institutions as we attempt to export
them internationally.340 Instead of relying only on adversarial deliberation
and voting in the legislature, it might be possible to create permanent
consensus-based structures within the legislature. Such a mechanism would
336 MAYER, supra note 120, at 63.
337 Id. at 62 (stating that while valued by participants, consensus building processes
are time-consuming and "are seldom the core component of how public policy disputes
are resolved").
338 Eloise Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the
Reauthorization of Head Start. From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement,
111 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 400 (2006) ("Consensus building avoids the adversarial
process associated with traditional legislating and lobbying.").
339 Klare, supra note 121, at 77.
340 See Anne Stephens, Book Note, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 335 (reviewing PAUL D.
CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA'S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYER-MISSIONARIES
(2005)).
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bring conflict resolution into the fold of normal government functions341 and
allow for different modalities of expression 342 on the way to creating widely
acceptable solutions. 343 One possibility is a bicameral legislature with a
large, adversarial lower house with majority-based decisions and a smaller,
consensus-based upper house. The upper house would hold mediated
discussions among representatives of specific interests. 344 Checks and
balances between these two houses may create harmony between majority
control and minority accommodation. 345 Also, the deliberation that is absent
from the lower house, because of constraints created by the complexities of
modern society, 346 is fully possible among the fewer, upper house legislators
that are each clearly affiliated with certain interests. This system may
therefore fit modern conditions and make full use of conflict resolution
policymaking tools. One candidate for this system, and a good example of
how this structure may be helpful, is the emerging Iraqi democracy. The Iraqi
government is torn by sharply-divided, combative factions, 347 and therefore
341 MAYER, supra note 120, at 62 (stating that conflict resolution methods "need to
be viewed as part of more traditional policymaking procedures, not as independent from
them"); see also SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 24, at 11.
342 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lecture, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and
Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 571 (2006) (summarizing the work of
Jon Elster on different motivations behind decisionmaking and how government
structures cater to them, and then concluding that "we can choose to use different
modalities of expression in different stages of decisionmaking to achieve different ends").
343 Id. at 573-74 ("[C]onsensus building allows a group to reach the best agreement
it can find, not just one that is barely acceptable to a majority.") (quoting Lawrence
Susskind).
344 Pub. Int'l Law & Policy Group and The Century Found., Establishing a Stable
Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic Considerations, 39 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 53, 83 (2004) ("Second chambers may be allocated a wide variety of
responsibilities and rights in order to protect the diverse interests of a state."). Thus, the
second chamber could be designed to represent the interests of the constituent units.
345 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 342, at 569 (citing to James Madison in the
Federalist Papers that discuss the "need for 'checks and balances' of different kinds of
processes and different sources of power, argument, and modalities of decisionmaking to
prevent the control and domination of either a dominant majority or the unruliness of
factions").
346 Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 318, at 1290 ("Congress faces tight deliberative
constraints of time and information."); see also Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note
21, at 326 ("[T]he earlier Congresses had the luxury of discussing fewer and less complex
issues than those facing Congress in the modem era.").
347 David Little, Religion, Conflict and Peace, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95, 101-
02 (2006) ("Among other problems are the existence of high-energy politics, a weak
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needs government structures that effectively address a diverse array of
interests. 348 A mediated, consensus-based upper house may better bring
factions to the table and ameliorate the power struggle that is at the heart of
Iraqi instability.349 In fact, Iraq may be able to implement this structure under
its current constitution, which establishes an adversarial lower house, but
allows for the creation of an upper house that will operate under an
unspecified process that will be determined by law. 350 Thus, opportunities
exist for consensus-based approaches to be better institutionalized in order to
develop legislative systems that fit modem society, especially in emerging
democracies.
C. Transformational Politics and the Societal Effects of Consensus-
Based Public Policymaking
While interest group mediation may improve democratic values in
Congress, greater use of consensual methods of government may have
broader implications for society. The Transformational Politics movement
envisions the widespread use of consensual methods in governmental
structures and the effects this may have on society. Transformational Politics
is a slightly amorphous,35' multifaceted umbrella-concept 35 2 for many new,
central government, sharply-divided, combative, and well-organized political parties, and
the absence of stable national and civic institutions.").
348 Pub. Int'l Law & Policy Group and The Century Found., supra note 344, at 61
("[S]tability must be ensured through the integrity of the institutions... [so] the need to
design institutions that can adequately represent the varied Iraqi interests without leading
to political gridlock will be paramount.").
349 Noah Feldman, Vali Nasr, James Fearon, & Juan Cole, Power Struggle, Tribal
Conflict or Religious War?, TIME, Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1167736,00.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2008) ("[T]he only way out of the violence is for Iraqis to realize that they have more to
gain by negotiating a settlement between their groups than they do by allowing a full-
blown brothers' war to break out. What lies at the heart of the sectarian violence in Iraq is
not so much religious dispute as it is a very secular competition for power and
prominence in the new Iraq.").
350 IRAQ CONSTITUTION § 3, ch. 1, art. 59, 64.
351 Christa Daryl Slaton, Stephen Woolpert, & Edward W. Schwerin, Introduction:
What Is Transformational Politics?, in TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS: THEORY, STUDY,
AND PRACTICE (Stephen Woolpert et al. eds., 1998).
352 Slaton, supra note 80, at 5 (stating that "transformational politics is a web of
theories").
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innovative ideas on changing 353 the basic structures and goals of
government. 354 This school of thought cuts against traditional, adversarial3 55
structures of governmental dispute resolution as a problematic "battle for
leverage" 356 that caters exclusively to the side that exerts the most
pressure.357 Transformational Politics focuses on conflict resolution358 and
acknowledges that collaboration is a superior method of human
interaction. 359
Transformational Political thinkers would advocate that consensus-
building methods become ingrained in the practices and norms of existing
government institutions.360 In practicing politics based on participation 361
and healing, 362 conflicting groups would learn to acknowledge differences
and avoid oversimplifications such as "us against them" and "right versus
wrong."363 This change in governmental practices even has the potential to
create tolerance and collaboration across the entire country 364 because the
current centralization of government and the media makes a top-down
transformation of values more possible. 365 Consensus-based actions among
leaders may result in amicable conduct among constituents. Therefore, as a
method of dealing with national issues and as a model of behavior for
supporters of these interests, institutional mediation may effectuate broad
social change. 366
353 EDWARD W SCHWERIN, MEDIATION, CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT, AND
TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS 3 (1995) (describing Transformational Politics as
"committed to examining alternatives").
354 Slaton, Woolpert, & Schwerin, supra note 351.
355 Slaton, supra note 80, at 13.
356 Tom Atlee, Transformational Politics (1991, revised Sept. 1999),
http://www.co-intelligence.org/CIPolTransformPol2.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
357 Id. ("Bits of cooperative activity creep in-like alliances, compromises, political
deals, protocols-if only to prevent the whole thing from tearing itself apart.").
358 SCHWERIN, supra note 353, at 6.
359 Id. at 5 (quoting Becker and Slaton).
360 See Michael S. Cummings, Transforming Public Policy: Beyond Affirmative
Action, in TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS: THEORY, STUDY, AND PRACTICE 229 (Stephen
Woolpert et al. eds., 1998).
361 SCHWERIN, supra note 353, at 3.
362 Id. at 4.
363 Id.
364 Slaton, Woolpert, & Schwerin, supra note 351.
365 Cummings, supra note 360, at 229.
366 CLOKE, supra note 84, at 276.
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Thus, beyond creating more creative, widely acceptable policy,
cooperative behavior among conflicting interests may lead the constituents of
these interest groups to accept the differences in basic values of constituents
of opposing interests and view society as more cooperative and peaceful.
Transformational Politics predicts that the greater use of consensual methods
of governance, such as interest group mediation, will create widespread
civility and social change.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper traces two themes. First, the theme of the problem involves
governmental structures dealing with an increasingly complex society. This
leads to overburdening pressure from petitioning interests, policies that have
difficulty adapting to various and changing situations, processes that do not
address different interests adequately, and groups seeking any means of
power over the process, including obstruction. The second theme is that of
the solution and it searches for methods to improve governmental processes
in tackling the above problem. Lobbyists would seem to argue that lobbying
has developed as the mechanism that aids Congress in dealing with
overwhelming amounts of information from interest groups and fellow
politicians. Conflict resolution theorists would counter that lobbying is
inefficient and that the better solution is direct citizen participation under
mediation.
The process of interest group mediation draws upon both lobbying and
conflict resolution mechanisms. It uses the established organization provided
by the interest group structure in order to represent interests. It then applies
innovative techniques in conflict resolution to facilitate the optimal use of
these groups. By allowing consensus-building efforts to supplement
conventional policymaking, this mechanism has the potential to make the
legislature become more efficient, responsive, and productive. Mediation's
value in public policymaking shows that it can be more that just an
alternative to the court system, 367 but also an "alternative model of power"368
to traditional, adversarial governance. A system that uses a consensus-based
367 Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 879 (1997) ("There are
features of mediation that make it particularly attractive beyond simply being an informal
alternative to the formal courts.").
368 GEORGE C. PAVLICH, JUSTICE FRAGMENTED: MEDIATING COMMUNITY DISPUTES
UNDER POSTMODERN CONDITIONS 149-50 (1996).
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model of power alongside traditional power structures will address a wide
range of interests to better serve modem conditions.
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